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Abstract. We are all aware that our idea of natural/unnatural has been changing over 
the centuries. According to Donna Haraway, we must exit the maze of dualisms that has 
marred the relationships between human and non-human nature for centuries. Cyborg 
is a figure of speech and asymbol, but preeminently a description of our actual being 
in contemporary technonature. Her idea has been picked up by artists (e.g. Lynn Ran-
dolph, Patricia Piccinini) and philosophers and theologians. The cyborgian organism/
human and the world cannot be articulated in terms of black-and-white, us and them, 
friend and foe, kin and alien, good and evil etc. Our technonatural creatures require 
our care and love, curiosity and investigation, and there will always be unexpected 
consequences.
Keywords: cyborg; symbol; technonature; challenges to theology and anthropology; 
Haraway; Tillich; Piccinini.
“We all live with a concrete awareness that we cannot say No to science, 
technology, and medicine. Even if we wanted to, we cannot say No to the 
medical complex that appropriates our bodies, defines our state of health, 
and positions us in a continuum of fitness from the temporarily abled to 
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the permanently disabled. [...] But how can we go about understanding and 
taking account of these deep and abiding presences in our bodies, our per-
sons, our selves? Furthermore, how are we to understand our other often 
intense hunger to say Yes?” (Downey & Dumit 1998, 5)
I am talking about cyborgs, as the possibility and reality to many 21st 
century people. I talk about cyborgs, following Donna Haraway, and NOT 
about the transhuman or robotics or artificial intelligence. All these em-
ploy radically differing philosophical and ethical commitments. Although 
the term posthuman can be understood as a more general one than cyborg 
(Antje Jackelén and some others have used also the notion of technosa-
piens1), I like the term and image, metaphor and figuration of the cyborg, 
because it is such a potent symbol of the difference effected by technology 
between the human and the posthuman. Haraway’s original definition and 
manifesto-style explanation was published as “Manifesto for Cyborgs: Sci-
ence, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s” in 1985, and it has 
been anthologized in slightly different versions in numerous collections 
of articles ever since. In her words: “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, 
a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as 
a creature of fiction.” (Haraway 1991, 149). In the figure of the cyborg, the 
human is physically intertwined with the nonhuman, the organic with the 
mechanical (cybernetic machine). It is a metaphor and figuration, it can 
count as a symbol, but it is also lived experience that changes what counts 
as a human being. It takes both the organic and the technological to have 
a cyborg!
It may seem strange to propose that Christian theologians should pon-
der the concept of the cyborg but it hardly seems strange to suggest that 
Christian theologians should concern themselves with what it means to be 
human. The cyborg is not following indiscriminately the posthuman pos-
sibilities and discourses, the cyborg does not need to be a human even! In 
fact, nobody knows what the posthuman means. However, the term posthu-
man has emerged as a way to describe a new and growing appreciation for 
1 Antje Jackelén, “The Image of God as Techno Sapiens.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Sci-
ence 37 (2002): 289–302.
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the plasticity and flexibility of „human nature“, spurred by discoveries in 
biotechnology and virtual, information and communication technologies. 
Posthuman has become a way of naming the unknown, possible, (perhaps) 
future, altered identity of human beings, as we incorporate various tech-
nologies into our human bodies and selves. It therefore functions as an 
umbrella term, covering a span of related concepts: genetically enhanced 
persons, artificial persons or androids, uploaded consciousness, cyborgs 
and chimeras (mechanical or genetic hybrids). Thus, the posthuman is not 
any one particular thing; it is an act of projection, of speculation about who 
we are as human beings, and who we might become. Posthuman is inher-
ently plural, a disturbing ambivalence. It is both liberating and oppressive 
in its multiple possibilities. Technological advances make promises of bet-
ter health, elimination of geneticlly heritable disease, longer lifespans, and 
perhaps even enhanced capabilities, but at the same time also represent an 
invasion of bodily integrity, as well as economic and political exploitation 
and oppression. It seems possible that both the promises and the threats 
will manifest themselves in equal measure.
The image of the cyborg has been employed for various kinds of theo-
retical work, not surprisingly in feminist science fiction and cyber-punk but 
also in geography, literary and religious studies and theology.
For a theologian it is still useful to discuss symbols with the help of 
Paul Tillich. In his essay from 1957, “Symbols of Faith”, he refers to the 
following characteristics of symbols:
1. A symbol “points beyond itself to something else.”
2. It participates in that to which it points.
3. A symbol “opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed to us.”
4. It “unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond 
to the dimensions and elements of reality”.
5. Symbols cannot be produced intentionally, or invented. They grow 
out of the individual or collective unconscious and must be accepted 
by the collective unconscious of the group in which they appear.
Haraway’s understanding of figure and figuration rests on readings of 
literary theory and philosophy, and the 18th century meaning of the “figu-
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ration” as “chimerical vision” is still implicit in her sense of figure. Figures 
have also another particular task. “Figures collect the people through their 
invitation to inhabit the corporeal story told in their lineaments. Figures 
are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material-se-
miotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one 
another” (Haraway 2008, 4).
What Paul Tillich adds, is the religious understanding of the cyborg as 
a symbol: religion cannot do without symbols, because religion has to do 
with ultimacy. Tillich remarks that “the true ultimate transcends the realm 
of finite reality infinitely. Therefore, no finite reality can express it directly 
and properly.” (Tillich 1957, 44). Thus we need symbols to speak about the 
deepest realities in life and about God.
The move to speak of cyborg as a symbol allows us to acknowledge the 
reality of our actual embodiment. The cyborg is not most importantly in-
formation about us human beings but rather the shape our actual humanity 
takes today. It is a proposal for understanding the fundamentals of human 
nature. These fundamentals include our biocultural and dual nature. Our 
cultural and technological nature is as indispensable for our survival as 
our biological nature – it is a knot in which bodies and meanings coshape 
or cocreate one another.
Feminist theorist Donna Haraway’s work on the symbol of the cyborg 
has proved seminal, as Haraway’s landmark essay, „A Cyborg Manifesto,“ 
((1985), 1991) has become a reference point for discussions of the posthu-
man. Haraway herself has moved on from the figure of the cyborg – now 
characterized by her as “junior siblings” – and has been emphasizing the 
companion species. The philosophical and ethical issues she identifies in 
the „Manifesto“ have been taken up by other scholars.
In „A Cyborg Manifesto“ (Haraway 1991, 149–181) Haraway builds on 
a critique of feminist essentialism, in which the identity of woman qua 
woman is assumed to be naturally given, self-evident, and unchanging. She 
points out that challenging patriarchal and colonial essentializing tenden-
cies eventually leads to the conclusion that all claims of identity based on 
a natural or organic standpoint are suspect. This is her reason for choosing 
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the cyborg as a feminist symbol; identifying herself as „cyborg“ is Hara-
way’s symbolic shorthand for the rejection of any attempt to define human 
identity on the basis of „nature“. This basic stance is the key critique of 
Haraway’s posthuman discourse on human nature, a deliberate breakdown 
of the dichotomy between nature and technology. One of the main tasks of 
the cyborg was to reanimate feminist encounters with the sciences and, in 
particular, to stake a feminist claim in constructions of nature.
1. What or who is Cyborg?
A cyborg is a hybrid figure: neither wholly organic nor solely mechanical, 
the cyborg is both simultaneously, straddling these taken-for-granted on-
tological and social categories. It is this hybrid aspect of cyborg existence 
that holds simulatenously so much threat and promise. Human beings 
construct social categories as a way of ordering our coexistence, and often 
experience the transgression of the boundaries of those categories as the 
threat of primordial chaos unleashing itself into our lives. And yet, those 
who find themselves outside the clean definitions of those social categories 
experience the transgression of them as a promise of liberation. Cyborg 
has become the label for a profound myth, hope and fear specific to the 
late modernity.
Haraway identifies three „breached boundaries“, represented by the 
cyborg: human/animal, organism/machine, and (as subset of the second) 
physical/nonphysical. These identified boundaries constitute the defining 
content of „human nature,“ and therefore the breaching of them consti-
tutes the challenge of posthuman to the concept of human nature.
Haraway states matter-of-factly that „by the late twentieth century in 
United States scientific culture, the boundary between human and animal 
is thoroughly breached.“ (Haraway 1991, 151) Yet, as her brief remarks 
make clear, it is not so much the advent of the cyborg, or even the science 
and technologies which make it possible, which has initiated this breach. 
Rather, it is simply the cumulative result of continuing biological research 
into evolutionary theory over the last 200 years. Many people, she claims, 
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are no longer invested in such a stark separation of human and nonhuman 
animal, and yet, of course, there is also a strong resistance to evolutionary 
theory, particularly evident within U.S culture.
The human/animal boundary breach is symbolized by the cyborg’s 
posthuman cousin, the chimera. A classic Greek mythical ontological cat-
egory, the chimera is now redefined as a genetic mixture of two animal spe-
cies, and represents the ultimate blurring of classificatory species bounda-
ries. Genetic engineering is so resulting perhaps even in a more spectacular 
and emotionally forceful way the breaching as more obviously mechanical 
cyborg technologies.
The second breached boundary identified by Haraway is organism and 
machine. Here, the cyborg is the result of the breached human/machine 
boundary, a fusion of organic life and mechanical object. Despite our in-
stinct to classify the cyborg an inhabitant of the imaginative worlds of 
science fiction, literal cyborgs abound: simple medical devices such as 
pacemakers, and more complicated medical devices such as prostheses 
or the ECMO („extracorporeal membrane oxygenation,“ a medical device 
which performs respiratory and blood pumping/scrubbing functions ex-
ternally from the body) or dialysis, join the organic human body to create 
an integrated system in which organic functions are regulated, restored, or 
replaced. These integrations may not be quite seamless ones we envision 
for the future, but they nonetheless meet the basic criterion of melding 
together, in some sense, the organic human body with mechanical device.
2. Ironic Contradictions
The cyborg was part of a military project, part of an extraterrestrial man-
in-space project. It was also a science fictional figure, in a macho form as 
well as objects of machinic, pornographic “iron maidens”. The term „cy-
borg“ was coined in 1960 by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (Rockland 
State University), to refer to their concept of a mechanically enhanced or 
altered human being who could survive extraterrestrial environments. 
Their proposal, presented first at the Psychophysiological Aspects of Space 
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Flight Symposium and published in an article called “Cyborgs and Space,” 
in the journal Astronautics’ September issue)2 defined cyborgs simply as 
„self-regulating man-machine systems“. As philosopher and cognitive 
scientist Andy Clark observes, the original 1960 vision of the cyborg was 
formulated precisely to liberate the human agent by allowing machine 
control to create additional layers of homeostatic functioning. Clynes and 
Kline wrote, „If man [sic] in space, in addition to flying his vehicle, must 
continuously be checking on things and making adjustments merely to 
keep himself alive, he becomes a slave to the machine. The purpose of the 
cyborg …. is to provide an organizational system in which such robot-like 
problems were taken care of automatically, leaving man free to explore, to 
create, to think and to feel“ (quoted from Clark 2003, 32). Thus, ironical-
ly, though the goal of Clynes and Kline’s cyborg proposal was actually an 
enhanced freedom for the human person, the means by which they sought 
to secure the freedom from bodily distractions now seems to potentially 
threaten the autonomy of will which they presume.
This ironic contradiction at the heart of the original cyborg proposal is 
traced out in Chris H. Gray’s analysis of the coping mechanisms of „medi-
cal cyborgs,“ individuals either temporarily or permanently dependent on 
machines to perform bodily functions for their survival, which explores 
the ways that this confusion of ontological and bodily boundaries affects 
the psyche. Technology brings freedom to the damaged organism but also 
creates dependence – medical cyborgs are aware that this liberation is the 
result of a dependence on mechanism that cannot ignored or denied (Gray 
1996). At least potentially, Haraway’s cyborg gains agency rather than los-
ing it, as a result of the new possibilities, alternatives, and alliances opened 
up by the breach of the human/machine boundary.
The third boundary breakdown is between organism and machine, the 
physical and nonphysical. This is not a commentary on materiality and 
2 A later paper “Sentic Space Travel”, authored by Manfred E. Clynes on the invitation of 
the Journal Astronautics in 1970 but not actually published then, was published (along 
with the reprint of the “Cyborgs and Space” and an interview with Clynes by Chris Hables 
Gray) in Chris Hables Gray, with the assistance of Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera & Steven 
Mentor (eds.), The Cyborg Handbook (New York & London: Routledge, 1995). 
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spirituality. Rather, as Haraway’s brief comments make clear, this is a way 
of describing how our machines and technologies have become in an im-
portant sense „invisible“. In many ways, unlike the conscious struggle to 
renegotiate bodily boundaries vis-a-vis the integration of medical devic-
es described before, the human-machine interface has become so simple, 
habitual, and ubiquitous that we scarcely notice our daily dependence on 
technologies for communication, transportation, and the supply of basic 
human needs. Haraway write, „Our best machines are made of sunshine; 
they are all light and clean because they are nothing but signals, electro-
magnetic waves, a section of a spectrum, and these machines are eminently 
portable, mobile… People are nowhere near as fluid, being both material 
and opaque“ (Haraway 1991, 153). These literally invisible (virtual, wire-
less) technologies affect us most profoundly, because they are so transpar-
ent in usage. The efficacy of such technologies lies precisely in their invis-
ibility, in the way they integrate themselves into our daily lives and habits 
and shape our patterns of thought and relationships, without our conscious 
notice of them. Constantly improved interfaces make these devices more 
user-friendly by requiring less conscious attention and fewer acquired skills 
in order to be effective. That is to say, technological improvement often 
translates into increased invisibility.
Often cyborgs and other posthuman hybrids are seen as figures of the 
monstrous, moral abominations resulting from the transgression of on-
tological boundaries. Just as a common ancestry with nonhuman animals 
seems to threaten the ontological distinctiveness of humanity, so too can 
the technological innovation of the cyborg, as it presumes an ontological 
kinship with the nonhuman machine. E.g. the figure of Borg in the 1990s TV 
series Star Trek: the Next Generation, provides an iconic example of the mon-
strous posthuman. The Borg is portrayed as a collective consciousness, with 
multiple, basically identical, organic bodies fully integrated with cybernetic 
prostheses and utterly lacking individual differentiation. Visually, the Borg’s 
technology seems to pierce the flesh in painful, invasive entry points along 
the body, the collective will of the Borg swamps the individual will just as 
invasively as its mechanical prostheses pierce the flesh. The Borg’s capture 
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of Captain Picard, who represents the very best of humanity, is therefore the 
ultimate threat: the extinction of human identity and individuality at the 
hands of impersonal mechanical, political or technological systems.
This is not so in feminist SF and science fact narratives (Haraway cites 
the work of Joanna Russ, Octavia E. Butler, Monique Wittig and some oth-
ers). Here the cyborg figures emerge as heroic protagonists, characters 
whose defiance of categorical identites is the source of powerful action. 
Crossing the boundaries is not itself the most exciting thing: the excite-
ment and significance depend on what happens after we have crossed the 
boundary, on what we make of being across the boundary. The passionate 
critics of technology or the figuration/symbol of cyborg falsify the real 
world, human culture and creativity (including creativity in technical 
realm), they see humans as no more than obedient gardeners-stewards of 
the natural environment. The passionate admirers may err in their posi-
tion of being precisely on the opposite side of critics: they also forget the 
boundary situation, and also the accountability and ambiguity of the cy-
borg-world. The cyborg was a figure that collected up many things, among 
them the way that post-World War II technoscientific cultures were deep-
ly shaped by information sciences and biological sciences. Haraway has 
explained her interest to “conceive all of us as communicative systems, 
whether we are animate or inanimate, whether we are plants, human be-
ings or the planet herself” (Haraway 2003, 48). Cyborg is an egalitarian 
project where all and everything can have their say.
When Lutheran theologian Paul Tillich spoke of being on the boundary, 
he emphasized the conflict between the worlds in his own person, and he 
speaks of this conflict as “fruitful for thought,” “difficult and dangerous,” 
demanding “decisions and thus exclusion of alternatives” (1966, 13). Tillich 
explores the possibilities of this situation, always under the impact of am-
biguity and ambivalence. Haraway explores, conversely, the ambiguity and 
ambivalence of the boundary, but always under the impact of the possibil-
ities. Situated knowledge and the elsewhere turn out to be epistemologi-
cally and metaphysically related, contrary to a simple notion of place and 
fantasies of the innocence of “the local” in eco-activist discourses.
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3. Mother Nature? Technonature?
One way of describing the cyborg’s defiance of these ontological bound-
aries is to call it „unnatural“. The hybridity of the cyborg, as well as its 
manufactured, technological origin, defy the expectation of a single, given, 
biologically inherited „Nature“. In a larger sense, as well, cyborg hybridity 
also calls into question the concept of „Nature“ as the determining origin 
of given biological natures.
Nature has always been a central topic for Haraway. As more than one 
scholar has noted, Haraway’s scholarly work in the history and philosophy 
of science, beginning with Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the 
World of Modern Science (Routledge, 1989), continuing through her work 
on technoscience and cyborgs and into her current work on interspecies 
relations, can be read as her nuanced, multi-leveled response to the ques-
tion „what gets to count as nature?“ As she says, nature is constructed, but 
not solely by humans; the construction of nature is a project undertaken 
by human and nonhuman agents. Nature is an imploded, densely packed 
location. It is the location where attitudes and practices regarding gen-
der, religion, science and technology, politics and family, race and identity 
come together, to be explained under the same rubric of natural givens and 
norms. Whatever nature is, it is not a simple given, and Haraway’s plea is 
that we recognize our responsibility in its construction, and our complicity 
in its destruction. Haraway’s second goal, equally important, is to resist 
reinscribing the same logic through an imposed „nature of no nature“, in 
which all that is nonhuman, dispossessed of previously presumed natural 
teleology and thus bereft of independent moral status or agency, passively 
receives the assigned teleology of human technoscience. Instead, she seeks 
to articulate a position in which the importance of human agency and the 
constructed nature of ontological categories is evident – and which simul-
taneously recognizes that human agents are not the only agents present 
within the realm of technoscience.
Haraway writes in the manifesto that not only is God dead, but so is the 
goddess. This declaration clearly sets the cyborg in opposition, not just to 
the culturally dominant and influential Christian narrative, but the reli-
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gious articulations of female affinity to nature, in the figures of the goddess 
or Mother Nature, as well. However, Haraway refuses to allow the easy sep-
aration of science and technology from its surrounding culture, including, 
of course, pervasive Christian influences and various New Age images. She 
refuses to credit either Nature or Woman as a source of political identity. 
But her main concern has been to find ways to craft more ethical, livable 
lives for all human and nonhuman organisms – there is no point of return, 
“there is no garden and never has been” (Haraway 2004, 83). The reality of 
nature cannot be apprehended separately from the nature that has been 
produced through, and by, Western scientific discourses that are them-
selves contextualized and bounded by histories marked by race, class, and 
sex. The impossibility of thinking nature (or reality) in isolation, demands 
the turn to different images and figurations (the cyborg, technonature, 
naturecultures, being or becoming worldly).
4. Reconfiguring subjectivity and theological interpretations
Haraway describes the human being in her „When Species Meet“: „I love 
the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent of all 
the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 per-
cent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, 
and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive 
at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of 
us, no harm… “ (Haraway 2008, 4). We are „walking, thinking ecologies,“ 
as Wesley Wildman says (2010, 165–166), and that in a world in which our 
walking, thinking, and being intimately depends upon the environmental 
scaffolding of our technologies. The concept of “the human” is contested, 
dynamic, and historical. As Haraway writes, “To be one is always to become 
with many” (Haraway 2008, 4).
In contrast to constructions of subjectivity which require humans to 
define their relationships to machines in ways that preserve conscious 
agency as the exlusive characteristic of human beings alone, denying the 
role that machines and other nonhuman components actually play in hu-
4(1) /2016306
A N N E K U L L
man decision-making, from a cyborg/posthuman perspective, „the pros-
pect of humans working in partnership with intelligent machines is not 
so much a usurpation of human right and responsibility as it is a further 
development in the construction of distributed cognition environments, 
a construction that has been going on for thousands of years“ (Hayles 1999, 
3–4). Further, „when the human is seen as part of a distributed system, the 
full expression of human capability can be seen precisely to depend on the 
splice rather than being imperiled by it,“ (Hayles 1999, 290).
What difference does this decentering of the human, in relation to both 
ecological and technological coordinates, make theologically? As a first 
observation, (post-)human subjectivity not only dismantles the anthropol-
ogy of the liberal humanist subject, but the theology of the God to whom 
that subject was presumably in relation. F. LeRon Shults writes, „we may 
still ask whether the Bible describes a God whose highest goal is glorifying 
himself as a single self-conscious Subject“ (Shults 2003, 240). Shults argues 
that a lack of attention to the Trinitarian personal relations of the three 
persons of God „led to a picture of an infinitely intelligent and powerful 
Subject who is intent on self-glorification“ – a description eerily reminis-
cent of Haraway’s description of the „(im)modest witness of the gentleman 
scholar in the narratives of the scientific revolution (here, God is not just 
an old man in the sky, He is a man in a lab coat in the sky; and scientific 
objectivity is indeed a god-trick). Shults’s observation is salutary: if that 
single self-conscious subject is not who we are, it’s not who God is, either.
Secondly, and this has profound implications for Christian spiritual 
practices and disciplines, this reconfigured posthuman subjectivity creates 
new space for the articulation of doctrines of prayer, spiritual growth, and 
the discernment and desiring of „God’s will“. Dismantling the centered 
and masterful subject is an affirmative project, ending not in the absence 
of the subject or its incorporation into the body of nature but in new and 
positive conceptions of subjectivity. The cyborg demonstrates that things 
get to be the way they are – whether good, bad, or indifferent – by being 
put together a bit at a time. The cyborg is a means of reclaiming agency 
and relationship, not losing them to technological determinism. But it is 
4(1) /2016 307
CY B O RG A N D R E L I G I O U S? T E C H N O N AT U R E A N D T E C H N O C U LT U R E
an agency whose boundaries are incorporative, not fortified; an agency 
which invates collaboration rather than insisting on autonomy. This is 
true on multiple levels: material, ontological, epistemological, social, and 
political; and here, I believe we may fairly add, theological: as we desire, 
seek out, and perfect the relationship with God which defines the imago 
dei, we invite the collaboration of divine agency to intertwine with our own.
While there has been a turn to the body in recent decades in theology, 
attention has been mainly on sexuality and gender. Embodiment, the body, 
however, – all singular – point to a concept of normative, homogeneous, 
human embodiedness. Following cyborgs in their everyday life, we know 
about the breakdown of ontological barriers: the cyborg signals do not take 
place in the abstraction of academic philosophical or theological discourse 
about technoscience and anthropology, but within actual bodies and lived 
experiences. Living as cyborg means recognition that the boundaries con-
structed to delineate the self cut across the predetermined categories, not 
as an act of will but as an acknowledgment of the material reality of actual 
bodies (Thweatt-Bates 2012, 154).
Recent US Hispanic and Latino/a perspectives on theological anthro-
pology place the notion of hybridity to the central place. Specifically Vir-
gilio Elizondo The Future is Mestizo (2000) demonstrates the importance 
of hybridity as an embodied and social experience. Elizondo’s interpreta-
tion of Jesus emphasizes his socio-cultural identity as a Galilean: a hybrid 
identity which was at once powerful and subversive. While socio-cultural 
hybridity is the issue here, the experience of hybridity is inevitably tied to 
bodily human reality.
The challenge for Christian theology, in engaging the cyborg, is not to 
demonstrate its rationality, but to demonstrate its capability for inclusivity 
and beneficence for all humans, posthumans, and nonhumans who togeth-
er inhabit God’s creation. I have considered briefly the Christological im-
plications to the incarnation and generally embodiment, if we extend sys-
tematically implications of the cyborg. The cyborg Christ, the hybrid reality 
of divine humanity, is creature – in a theological context which no longer 
needs to protect the divine nature from material corruption (because we 
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do not need the substance philosophy to back up the the notion of person), 
can be heard in a wholly redemptive way; creature is no longer the opposite 
of God, or, to put it differently, we creatures are not doomed to relate to 
God as God’s opposition.
We might consider also Jesus as a „trickster figure“ – Jesus as an active 
participant, rather than a passive resource, in our theological and Christo-
logical constructions, an agent who is a shape shifter, who might trouble 
our notions – all of them: classical, biblical, scientific, modernist, postmod-
ernist, and feminist – of the human-, while making us remember why we 
cannot want this problematic universal. Just as Christ’s relation to God is 
part of his (post)humanity, so too we can hope to redraw the boundaries of 
our human subjectivity to include a relation to God in which our wills co-
incide and indeed become indistinguishable. This indwelling of the Spirit, 
this ontological relation, this desirable permeability between the bound-
aries of self and God, is modeled for us in the ultimate human, the cyborg 
Christ, who invites us, too, to participate in the life of God (Kull 2001).
Haraway is narrating her science facts and fictions in the context of 
academy, Octavia Butler and several others are doing the same critical 
work via science fiction writing, and some people do the same via their 
art. Lynn Randolph has painted in response to Haraways essays, and Har-
away has commented on her paintings. Another sister in technoculture, 
“a co-worker committed to taking “naturescultures” seriously without the 
soporific seductions of a return to Eden or the palpitating frisson of a jer-
emiad warning of the coming technological Apocalypse” (Haraway 2007), 
as Haraway describes her, is also an Australian artist Patricia Piccinini. 
Piccinini’s objects are replete with narrative speculative fabulation. Her 
visual and sculptural art is about worlding, i.e., “naturalcultural” worlds 
at stake, worlds needy for care and response, worlds full of unsettling but 
oddly familiar creatures who turn out to be simultaneously near kin and 
alien colonists. Piccinini’s worlds – as Haraway’s own – require curiosity, 
emotional engagement, and investigation, and they do not yield to clean 
judgments or bottom lines – especially not about what is living or nonliv-
ing, organic or technological, promising or threatening.
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Piccinini’s worlds are full of youngsters – including pink and blue truck 
babies promising to tell where grown-up trucks come from, ambiguously 
fetal-like transgenics in Science Story, trusting kids with believable-unbe-
lievable creatures. Could the worlds of technoculture ever come to be quiet 
country? It depends, Piccinini seems to suggest, depends on love, care, 
courage, inspiration, solidarity, and justice.
Most of Piccinini’s work are premised on bioscientific practices of ma-
nipulation and alteration of living beings, of creating “new Worlds” if only 
“in art”. What is the heritage for which technocultural beings are both 
accountable and indebted? What must the practices of love look like in this 
tangled wild/quiet country? Piccinini’s essay, “In Another Life” (www.pa-
triciapiccinini.net), poses the question of care in words, “I am particularly 
fascinated by the unexpected consequences, the stuff we don’t want but 
must somehow accommodate. There is no question as to whether there will 
be undesired outcomes, my interest is in whether we will be able to love 
them.” At her 2003 lecture at the Tokyo University of Fine Art, Piccinini 
laid out her large, queer, non- hetero-normative view of our technocultural 
family: “In my work, perhaps I am saying that whether you like them or you 
don’t like them, we actually have a duty to care. We created them, so we’ve 
got to look after them.” Looking after imperfect, messy, really existing, 
mortal beings is much more demanding – not to mention playful, intellec-
tually interesting, and emotionally satisfying – than living the futuristic 
nightmare of techno-immortality.
People of technoculture have a familial, generational duty to their fail-
ures, as well as their accomplishments. Natural or not, good or not, safe or 
not, the creatures of technoculture make a body-and-soul changing claim 
on their “creators” that is rooted in the generational obligation of and ca-
pacity for responsive attentiveness. To care is to know how to nurture our 
creatures and co-creators through the often unexpected generations, not 
to point toward future utopia or dystopia. But reconciliation is not guar-
anteed. What is guaranteed is that nature and culture are tightly knotted 
in bodies, ecologies, technologies, and times, we are dependent on our 
companion species, real and fictional (dogs, angels, and one may extend 
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the list…). Cyborg as a symbol and a figuration, a promise and a threat, 
for our time and our being can be talked about rationally – one does not 
need to invoke some further authority or arcane personal experience, cy-
borg-being is already our daily experience at least in its low-tech versions 
(starting with eyeglasses and all other kinds of compensating, restorative, 
or normalizing and very intimate organic-mechanic relations). Perhaps 
the concept of cyborg can be falsified or substituted by something more 
fitting in the future. But that is not the point. Rather, can we live up to this 
critical love and hope Haraway and Piccinini are calling us in relation to 
our creations?
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